Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001 (English Edition)
Description
Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon.
To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA’s intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.
Dr. Milo Jones is a Senior Advisor for geopolitics and technology at Arcano Partners in Madrid, visiting Professor at IE University, and a visiting Research Fellow at the Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford.
His expertise lies applying the models, frameworks and tools of the Intelligence Community and Geopolitics to financial and business issues.
He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, AFIO, and a Fellow of the Salzburg Global Seminar.
Philippe Silberzahn is Professor of Strategy at Emlyon Business School and a Research Fellow at Ecole Polytechnique. He holds a PhD in Entrepreneurship from École Polytechnique, the leading French institution combining top-level research, academics, and innovation at the cutting-edge of science and technology.